

Forward Pass: On the Security Implications of Email Forwarding Mechanism and Policy

Enze “Alex” Liu, Gautam Akiwate, Mattijs Jonker, Ariana Mirian, Grant Ho, Geoffrey M. Voelker, Stefan Savage




UC San Diego

UNIVERSITY
OF TWENTE.

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.07287> (EuroS&P '23)

Email Authentication in the Simplest Form



Challenges in Email Authentication

[security-lunch] 5/10 Alex Liu on "Forward Pass: Implications of Email Forwarding Mechanism and Policy"



Trisha Chadha Datta

to security-lunch@lists.stanford.edu ▼

Hi all,

This Wednesday at noon at Security Lunch, Alex Liu will be presenting "Forward Pass: Implications of Email Forwarding Mechanism and Policy." See abstract

Challenges in Email Authentication

You can forward your email to another account.




Enable forwarding

Forward my email to:


gautam@gmail.com

Forward Pass: A 10,000-foot View



Forward Pass: Contributions

- Goal: forwarding practices and their security implications
- Methodology: 20 services that support forwarding
- Results:
 - A range of assumptions and practices
 - Four distinct kinds of evasion attacks




The Washington Post

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
Background: SPF

IP-based authentication




Background: DKIM

Signature-based authentication




Background: DMARC

- **FROM** header is not authenticated



- Combines **SPF** and **DKIM** to authenticate FROM
 - If SPF passes, check if $\text{Domain}(\text{MAILFROM}) = \text{Domain}(\text{FROM})$
 - If DKIM passes, check if $\text{Domain}(\text{DKIM-Sign}) = \text{Domain}(\text{FROM})$

Authenticating an Email from state.gov



Server's IP allowed by state.gov?

Signed by state.gov?

Methodology

- Goal: forwarding practices and their security implications
- 16 mail providers + 4 mailing lists



Practices

Assumptions

Attacks

Practice: Whitelisting

[Euro S&P 2023] Decision on Submission #17 External Spam x



hotcrp-mail@ieee-security.org

to me ▼

Why is this message in spam? It is similar to messages that were identified as spam in the past.

Report not spam

Practice: Whitelisting

Gmail: ☒ Never send it to Spam

Outlook:

Safe senders and domains

Don't move email from these senders to my Junk Email folder.

A spoofed email as state.gov



blinken@state.gov

to me ▼

Whitelisting allows a **malicious user** to bypass authentication checks for **spoofed emails**

Practice: Open Forwarding

You can forward your email to another account.

☒ Enable forwarding

Forward my email to:

gautam@gmail.com

I will do you a favor by
not asking you to
verify that you own
gautam@gmail.com



Practice: Open Forwarding

You can forward your email to another account.

☒ Enable forwarding




Forward my email to:

joe.biden@whitehouse.gov

Open forwarding allows **a malicious** user to forward to **arbitrary destination without authorization**

Practice: Relaxed Validation

Trusting forwarded email messages from certain providers



Relaxed validation assumes that **upstream providers do not forward spoofed emails**

Attack: Relaxed Validation




Attack: Relaxed Validation




Attack: Relaxed Validation



Attack: Relaxed Validation



Attack: Relaxed Validation



SPF's Outdated **Assumption**

- When SPF was created
- Nowadays: shared SPF



SPF: **allow 1.2.3.4**




SPF: **allow 5.6.7.8**



SPF: **allow outlook.com**



SPF: **allow outlook.com**



Attack: Shared SPF



SPF: allow outlook.com

Attack: Shared SPF




SPF: allow outlook.com

Attack: Shared SPF




SPF: allow outlook.com

Attack: Shared SPF




SPF: allow outlook.com

Attack: Shared SPF



Attack: Shared SPF



The Washington Post

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Root Causes

- Forward works at odds with authentication protocols
- Ad-hoc implementation decisions
- No guidelines on how to implement forwarding
- SPF's outdated assumption

Mitigations

- Disable open forwarding
- Remove relaxed validation
- Separate servers for sending and forwarding
- New protocols (e.g., ARC)

Disclosure

- All providers acknowledged the reported issues



- Some fixed; some partially fixed; some didn't

Summary

- Goal: forwarding practices and their security implications
- Large-scale measurement of 20 forwarding services
- Forwarding practices, assumptions, and attacks



If You Can Only Remember One Thing



 e7liu@eng.ucsd.edu

 e7liu.github.io

<https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.07287>