No Privacy Among Spies:

Assessing the Functionality and Insecurity of Consumer Android Spyware Apps

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A real story of tech-enabled stalking

"He's tracking [everything]. Whatever I do, he sees that..."

(Survivor of Intimate Partner Violence)

Tech-enabled stalking is on the rise

Hundreds of Apps Can Empower Stalkers to Track Their Victims

51% Increase in the Use of Online Spying and Stalking Apps During Lockdown









Consumer

spyware

apps



TheTruthSpy is a free mobile spying app that helps you to track any type of Android devices. app comes with more than ten free advance features that you can use for tracking phone ac


Monitor GPS locations, text messages, live calls, social media accounts, and more, all for free Undetectable and can be installed on almost any smartphone and tablet.



Download TheTruthSpy APK File



Methodology: reverse engineering



Source Files (.apk files)


Java Files

An in-depth analysis of technical capabilities

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - | |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-------|----------|---------------------|-----------|------------|----------|-------|----------|-------------|-------------|----------|-------|-------|--------|---------------|----|----|----|----|---|
| | Capabi | ilities | | ' | r-free | L | .e | ac | lir | ng | A | n | dr | oi | d | sp | Ŋ\ | wa | re | ap | ps | 5 |
| | Category | Capabilities | | mSPY | Mobile-tracker-free | Clevguard | HoverWatch | Flexispy | Spyic | Spyhuman | TheTruthSpy | iKeyMonitor | Cerberus | Spy24 | Spapp | Meuspy | Highstermobil | | | | | |
| 1 | | Ambient Recording | 1 | | * | | | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | | |
| 1 | | Calendar | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| | | Call Logs | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| 1 | | Clipboard | | | * | | | | _ | _ | ± | + | | * | | | | | | | | |
| 1 | | Contacts | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| 1 | Basic Capabilities (§ 3.2) | Info of Other Applications | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| | 1 (0) | Location | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| | | Network Info | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| | | Phone Info | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| l | | SMS or MMS | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| 1 | | Shared Media Files | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| - | | Invisible camera access | | _ | * | * | * | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| 1 | D . O .1 (0.0.0) | Invisible microphone access | | | * | * | * | * | | * | * | * | | * | * | * | | | | | | |
| 1 | Data Gathering (§ 3.3) | Accessing protected data | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| 1 | | Taking screenshots | , | * | * | * | * | | | * | | * | | * | * | * | | | | | | |
| _ | | Hiding app icon | , | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | | |
| | Hiding the App (§ 3.4) | Launching a hidden app | | | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | | |
| | | Hide from recents screen | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | * | * | * | | * | * | | | | | |
| - | D : (0.0.5) | Obscuring the uninstallation pr | ocess | * | * | * | | * | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | | |
| | Persistence (§ 3.5) | Creating "diehard" services | | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | * | | | | | |
| _ | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

Table 2: Summary of capabilities studied. A star denotes that an app implements a particular capability.

Vignette #1: invisible camera access








Vignette #1: invisible camera access – via 1x1 preview


Normal app:

* Show a preview to the user




Spyware app:

* A preview of size 1x1 (invisible)!




Vignette #1: invisible camera access - via raw frames

Apps can capture raw frames from the camera




Vignette #2: hiding app icons

Pre-setup:




Post:




Vignette #2: hiding app icons

Pre-setup:



Post:



Takeaway: spyware apps are technically sophisticated

But ironically, they are not very secure


LetMeSpy, a phone tracking app spying on thousands, says it was hacked

Hackers explain how they "owned" FlexiSpy

Popular mSpy Smartphone Parental Control App gets Hacked

What are the measures taken by spyware apps to protect user data?

Methodology: an end-to-end approach




Results: a range of privacy deficiencies

| Spyware Apps | Eavesdropping Sensitive PII | Cross-account Request Forgery | Unauthenticated Access to Victim Data | Poor Data Retention Practices | Unauthenticated SMS Commands |
|---------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Cerberus | | | Audio* | | |
| Flexispy | | | Images/Audio* | | |
| Highstermobile | | | Images | \bigcirc | |
| Hoverwatch | | | Audio* | | |
| iKeyMonitor | | | | | |
| LetMeSpy | | | | | |
| Mobile-tracker-free | | | Streaming | | \bigcirc |
| mSPY | \bigcirc | | Images | | |
| Spapp | | | Images/Audio/Streaming | \bigcirc | \bigcirc |
| Spy24 | | | Streaming* | | |
| Spyhuman | | | Images/Audio | | |
| Spyzie | | | Images* | \bigcirc | |
| Spylive360 | | | Images/Audio | \bigcirc | |
| Talklog | | | • | | |
| TheTruthSpy | | \bigcirc | Images/Audio | | |

Table 3. Systematization of commodity spyware vulnerabilities. (Circles denote the severity level of the insecurity. \bigcirc indicates at least one instance of the insecurity; \bigcirc indicates all app functionality is insecure; * indicates URLs are temporary and expire.)

Vignette #1: unauthenticated SMS commands



Vignette #2: transmitting data in plaintext







Username: victim@gmail.com

Password: xxxxxxx

Called Alice at midnight



Vignette #3: cross-account request forgery



Takeaway: no enough effort in securing sensitive user data

Disclosed to all vendors yet received no response

Summary

- Contribution #1: in-depth analysis of consumer Android spyware apps
 - Studied the spying capabilities of 14 leading spyware apps
 - Documented the creative ways of using APIs
 - Including previously unknown approaches
- Contribution #2: security analysis on user data protection
 - Identified a range of privacy deficiencies



